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I
N THE 1980S THE U.S. criminal justice system faced rising
numbers of inmates and overcrowded prison conditions. The
federal government and many state governments looked to
the private sector for some relief.1 The result was the emer-
gence of a new concept: the privatization of corrections, occasion-
ally known as “prisons for profit,” “punishment for profit,” or
“dungeons for dollars.” 
Prison privatization differs from private industries in prisons,
which seek to turn prisoners into productive members of society by
having them work at a decent wage and produce products or per-
form services that can be sold in the marketplace.2 Privatization is
also different from the situation in which some of the services of a
facility — such as medical, food, educational, or vocational servic-
es — are operated by private industry. Rather, the idea is to have the
government contract with a private company to operate — and
sometimes own — the total institution. The practice quickly spread
abroad, with countries such as Australia, New Zealand, and the
United Kingdom privatizing parts of their correctional systems. 
Sir Nigel Rodley, former United Nations Special Rapporteur
on Torture, explains that “the profit motive of privately operated
prisons … has fostered a situation in which the rights and needs of
prisoners and the direct responsibility of states for the treatment of
those they deprive of freedom are diminished in the name of
greater efficiency.”3 Where the safe and fair treatment of prisoners
is compromised by private corporate goals, national law and inter-
national human rights instruments should protect them. In
Professor Cosmo Graham’s words, there is an attendant tension
“between a human rights approach and an approach to policy
delivery that emphasizes the virtues of market based delivery
mechanisms.”4 This article argues that the concept of privatization
of corrections is bad policy, is based on a tenuous legal foundation,
and has profound moral implications.
ADVANTAGES AND CRITICISMS: A MAJOR DEBATE
PROPONENTS OF THE PRIVATIZATION of prisons and jails —
including some corrections professionals, major financial brokers,
and investors — argue that the government has been doing a dis-
mal job in its administration of correctional institutions. Costs
have soared and prisoners are kept in conditions that shock the
conscience, often coming out worse than when they went in. 
The private sector, advocates claim, can save the taxpayers
money. It can build facilities faster and cheaper, and it can operate
them more economically and more efficiently. With maximum
flexibility and little or no bureaucracy, new ideas (like testing new
philosophies) and routine matters (like hiring new staff ) can be
implemented quickly. Overcrowding — perhaps the major prob-
lem of corrections today — can be reduced. A final anticipated
benefit of privatization is decreased government liability in law-
suits brought by inmates and prison employees.
Critics argue that as a matter of policy it is inappropriate to
operate prisons with a profit motive, which provides no incentive
to reduce overcrowding (especially if the company is paid on a per-
prisoner basis), to consider alternatives to incarceration, or to deal
with the broader problems of criminal justice.5 On the contrary,
critics assert that the incentive would be to build more prisons and
jails, which would be filled with more prisoners. This is a fact of
correctional life: the number of jailed criminals typically rises to fill
whatever space is available.
Privatization also raises concerns about the routine, quasi-
judicial decisions that affect the legal status and well-being of
inmates. To what extent, for example, should a private corporation
employee be allowed to use force — perhaps serious or deadly force
— against a prisoner? It is difficult enough to control violence in
the public correctional system. It is much more difficult to assure
that violence is administered only to the extent required by cir-
cumstances when the state relinquishes direct responsibility. With
dispersion of accountability, the possibility for vindictiveness
increases. For example, an employee in charge of reviewing disci-
plinary cases at a privately run Immigration and Naturalization
Service facility in Houston, Texas, once told a New York Times
reporter, “I am the Supreme Court.”6
INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS
INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS instruments pose additional
problems for private incarceration. It is clear — at least at a theo-
retical level — that prisoners retain their human rights even when
deprived of their liberty. The International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights, for example, commands that “[a]ll persons
deprived of their liberty shall be treated with humanity and with
respect for the inherent dignity of the human person.”7 Other
human rights documents that offer similar commands are the Basic
Principles for the Treatment of Prisoners (Basic Principles),8 the
Body of Principles for the Protection of All Persons under Any
Form of Detention or Imprisonment,9 the African Charter on
Human and Peoples’ Rights,10 and the American Convention on
Human Rights.11
When prisoners are held for profit rather than for the ends
of justice, they are not always treated with dignity. “When pris-
oners become units from which profit is derived, there is a ten-
dency to see them as commodities.”12 The following sections
explore numerous human rights dictates and their relationship
to private prisons.
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STAFFING
International human rights instruments recognize the crucial
role played in prisons and jails by a well-trained and professional
staff. For example, the Standard Minimum Rules for the Treatment
of Prisoners (Standard Minimum Rules) explains that the proper
administration of prisons depends on prison personnel to have the
“integrity, humanity, professional capacity and personal suitability
for the work.”13 The Code of Conduct for Law Enforcement
Officials (Code of Conduct) requires that “[g]overnment and law
enforcement agencies … ensure that all law enforcement agencies
are selected by proper screening procedures, have appropriate
moral, psychological and physical qualities for the effective exercise
of their functions.”14
The Standard Minimum Rules provide details on how prison
administrations can secure suitable qualities in their staff: 
[P]ersonnel shall be appointed on a full-time basis as pro-
fessional prison officers and have civil service status with
security of tenure subject only to good conduct, efficien-
cy and physical fitness. Salaries shall be adequate to
attract and retain suitable men and women; employment
benefits and conditions of service shall be favourable in
view of the exacting nature of the work.15
None of these conditions is regularly met in the private prison
industry, and the low wages and poor working conditions in pri-
vate prisons do not allow personnel managers to be selective in
their hiring.
Obviously, security officers and prison personnel in private
prisons are not civil service employees. Without the stability and
protection of civil service, the turnover rate for security staff in pri-
vate prisons in the U.S. is over 50 percent, compared to just 16
percent for public facilities.16 In the United Kingdom, staff
turnover at private prisons is 35 percent, while it is only five per-
cent in the public sector.17 Turnover rates at individual prisons can
be much worse than these averages: one private facility in Florida
reported an annual staff turnover rate of 200 percent.18
Salaries for guards at private facilities also lag behind those of
public employees, as one of the principal cost-cutting areas in pri-
vate prisons is in labor costs. Private prison companies generally
pay employees less than public institutions in both direct salary
and fringe benefits.19 For instance, the starting salary for guards at
a private prison in Alabama is $7 per hour, compared with $11 per
hour for public guards. In the U.K. the average pay for private
prison officers is more than 50 percent less than it is for public
prison officers.20 This is hardly the type of incentive needed by
prisons to recruit suitable security guards.
Moreover, the conditions of employment at private prisons
tend not to contribute to the recruitment or retention of suitable
personnel. The staff-to-inmate ratios are 15 percent lower at pri-
vate prisons than public ones, which increases the workload for
private guards.21 Employees in one private British detention center
had to work 12-hour shifts with no lunch breaks for 7-day stretch-
es.22 A guard at a private facility in Tennessee found the conditions
so demoralizing that he returned to his previous job at a fast food
restaurant, where he felt his work would be better respected.23
Private facilities in Australia have experienced a number of
security staff walkouts because of poor working conditions. At Port
Hedland, for instance, guards walked off the job as a result of fear
that detainees were stockpiling homemade weapons — a charge
the chief executive officer of the detention center denied even
when presented with evidence. As the local union leader explained,
the private prison “can’t ensure the guards’ safety and for budget
constraints they don’t want to.”24 At a Canadian prison, guards had
to organize their own campaign to get vaccinations for Hepatitis B
despite obvious risks at the facility. A local health professional
reported that “[p]ublic-run institutions vaccinate each of their staff
… [b]ut in a private-run enterprise, profit comes at the expense of
the workers.”25
STAFF TRAINING AND EXPERIENCE
Beyond staff recruitment and retention, international instru-
ments emphasize the importance of adequate experience and train-
ing for prison personnel so that they are qualified to enforce a dep-
rivation of liberty while simultaneously upholding a prisoner’s
other human rights. The Code of Conduct insists that prison offi-
cials receive “continuous and thorough professional training.”26
The Standard Minimum Rules similarly require that “[b]efore
entering on duty, the personnel shall be given a course of training
in their general and specific duties,” and “[a]fter entering on duty
and during their career, the personnel shall maintain and improve
their knowledge and professional capacity by attending courses of
in-service training to be organized at suitable intervals.”27 Reports
indicate, however, that private prison guards receive 35 percent
fewer pre-service training hours than public corrections officers.28
In addition, because of the high staff turnover rate at private facil-
ities, large numbers of guards are new each year. These new staff
members are often new not only to the private facility but also to
the field of corrections. The staff of a private prison in Western
Australia, for example, includes 90 percent with no previous cor-
rectional experience.29
This staffing pattern often leads to circumstances in which
the prisoners are more experienced than the prison staff. In a report
published in September 2003, the chief inspector of prisons for
England described the situation at the privately run Dovegate
prison as follows:
[T]here was … a worrying lack of experience and confi-
dence amongst a young, locally recruited staff, few of
whom had any previous prison experience, and who were
operating with low staffing levels and high staff turnover.
By contrast Dovegate’s prisoners were not inexperienced
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A guard patrols the cellblock at MCI Cedar Junction in Walpole,
Massachusetts.
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… Dovegate receives large numbers of long-term, rela-
tively sophisticated prisoners, used to the system and
capable of exploiting any weaknesses or naivety in the
staff who supervise them.30
At a private facility in Arizona, prisoners had the upper hand
such that they even had some staff members “working” for differ-
ent inmate gangs.31 Newspapers in Scotland reported on a heroin
distribution ring inside a private prison at which “the cons think
they run the place” and the intimidated staff were unwilling to
challenge them.32
Decisions to limit staff training are often based specifically on
financial savings. The management of a private prison in Ohio, for
instance, decided to skip firearms training for their guards simply
because of a $3,000 cost for state certification.33 This decision,
however, did not stop the company from requiring the guards to
handle firearms. One former guard recalls that she was told to
patrol the perimeter of the facility with a shotgun despite her
protests that she did not know how to use it.34
The training that new recruits do receive exposes questionable
attitudes about the human rights of prisoners. For example, new
recruits in a private United Kingdom facility were told, “[I]f you
start treating these people humanely, they think it’s a pushover.”35
In Texas, private guards made a “training video” in which they were
beating, stun-gunning, and unleashing dogs on naked prisoners;
this situation was strikingly similar to some of the abuses involving
private contractors and others at the Abu Ghraib prison in Iraq.36
Although the Basic Principles commands that “[l]aw enforce-
ment officials, in their relations with persons in custody or deten-
tion, shall not use force, except when strictly necessary for the
maintenance of security and order within the institution, or when
personal safety is threatened,”37 allegations of excessive and
improper use of force are common in the field of private incarcer-
ation. Similar prohibitions exist in other human rights documents
as well. The Standard Minimum Rules states that “[o]fficers of the
institutions shall not, in their relations with the prisoners, use force
except in self-defence or in cases of attempted escape, or active or
passive physical resistance to an order based on law or regula-
tions.”38 The Code of Conduct states that “[l]aw enforcement offi-
cials may use force only when strictly necessary and to the extent
required for the performance of their duty.”39 Without better
employee screening and training, private corrections officers resort
to force more often than is necessary.
MEDICAL ACCESS
International human rights principles require that correc-
tional facilities offer adequate access to medical treatment.
Human rights instruments that address prisoner medical care
include the Basic Principles (requiring that prisoners “have access
to the health services available in the country without discrimina-
tion on the grounds of their legal situation”)40 and the Standard
Minimum Rules (providing details for fulfilling human rights
obligations, such as “[i]n institutions which are large enough to
require the service of one or more full-time medical officers, at
least one of them shall reside on the premises of the institution or
in its immediate vicinity,” and “[i]n other institutions the medical
officer shall visit daily and shall reside near enough to be able to
attend without delay in cases of urgency.”)41 In addition, the
Code of Conduct requires that “[l]aw enforcement officials shall
ensure the full protection of the health of persons in their custody
and, in particular, shall take immediate action to secure medical
attention whenever required.”42
Despite the guidance of these international instruments,
however, medical offerings at private prisons are often bare-bones
operations. A Canadian health professional had praise for the doc-
tors and nurses who tried to run a private jail infirmary, but he
added, “[o]ne doctor for 1,100 inmates at a time is woefully inad-
equate.”43 Because of the severe understaffing, he said that prison-
ers regularly are sent to the local hospital “writhing in agony
because they haven’t received proper pain medication, or with
physical conditions that have worsened through neglect.”44
The Principles of Medical Ethics Relevant to the Role of
Health Personnel, Particularly Physicians, in the Protection of
Prisoners and Detainees against Torture and Other Cruel,
Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or Punishment offer further
direction on human rights obligations: “Health personnel, partic-
ularly physicians, charged with the medical care of prisoners and
detainees have a duty to provide them with protection of their
physical and mental health and treatment of disease of the same
quality and standard as is afforded to those who are not impris-
oned or detained.”45 In sharp contrast to this directive is the tes-
timony of a nurse at a private detention center in Australia who
explained that during a prisoner riot medical staff were instructed
to treat only guards and not detainees.46 And a judge in Texas
described the medical neglect of an 18-year-old prisoner who died
of pneumonia despite repeated requests for medical attention as
“modern day torture.”47
PRISONER PROGRAMS
In addition to medical care, prisons have a responsibility to
provide prisoners with suitable rehabilitation programs. Programs
for prisoners, such as substance-abuse treatment, education, and
job training, however, tend to be limited in private correctional
facilities. Private prisons have a double disincentive to aid in the
rehabilitation of their charges: by skimping on programs they save
money immediately and, by letting prisoners serve out their terms
without access to proper rehabilitation programs, they increase the
likelihood that those prisoners will become “repeat customers.” 
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The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
directs that the “essential aim” of the penitentiary system “shall be
[prisoners’] reformation and social rehabilitation.”48 Adding more
detail, the Standard Minimum Rules requires that
[A]ll appropriate means shall be used, including religious
care in the countries where this is possible, education,
vocational guidance and training, social casework,
employment counselling, physical development and
strengthening of moral character, in accordance with the
individual needs of each prisoner, taking account of his
social and criminal history, his physical and mental
capacities and aptitudes, his personal temperament, the
length of his sentence and his prospects after release.49
Yet, an unannounced inspection of a private facility in the
United Kingdom revealed prisoners who had not been provided
with any activity and who often spent their days in bed.50 A pri-
vate jail in Texas was investigated for diverting $700,000 from a
drug-treatment program, while inmates with substance-abuse
problems received no treatment whatsoever. In Minnesota a pri-
vate facility neglected to establish a substance abuse treatment pro-
gram even though the contract required it.51 The nearby public
prison, by contrast, provided its chemically dependent inmates
with full-day therapeutic sessions five times a week.52
Where services exist, they may be of poor quality. Anne
Owens, the chief inspector of prisons for England and Wales,
explained that “private sector contracts have tended to focus on the
quantity rather than the quality” of programs, thus work available
for prisoners at a particular prison was low skilled and not accred-
ited.53 Briefing notes following an inspection of a prison in
Australia described the rehabilitation programs as “chaotic.”54
Job training programs are singled out in the Basic Principles
and the Standard Minimum Rules, which require, respectively,
that “[c]onditions shall be created enabling prisoners to undertake
meaningful remunerated employment which will facilitate their
reintegration into the country’s labour market and permit them to
contribute to their own financial support and to that of their fam-
ilies,” and that “[v]ocational training in useful trades shall be pro-
vided for prisoners able to profit thereby and especially for young
prisoners.”55 Where job training programs exist, however, they
often do not do much to prepare inmates for the labor market. In
a youth facility in Louisiana, for instance, a job training class con-
sisted entirely of showing tool handling safety videos. When the
participants finished watching the videos, they simply watched
them again.56
GOVERNMENT RESPONSIBILITY
Perhaps most important for the purpose of examining the pri-
vatization of corrections are the Maastricht Guidelines, which make
clear that the state is ultimately responsible for the operations of pri-
vate prisons and detention centers despite its lesser role in day-to-
day operations. The guidelines counsel that, although the
challenge of addressing violations of economic, social and
cultural rights is rendered more complicated by [trends
toward privatization of government services], it is more
urgent than ever to take these rights seriously and, there-
fore, to deal with the accountability of governments for
failure to meet their obligations in this area.57
Abdicating the task of keeping prisoners does not allow a state
to abdicate the responsibility for their security, health, and humane
treatment.
Consider the 1993 European Court of Human Rights case of
Costello-Roberts v. United Kingdom.58 A seven-year-old student at a
private school had been “whacked” three times on his backside
(through his shorts) with a rubber-soled gym shoe after numerous
disciplinary problems. The possibility of corporal punishment was
not mentioned in the school’s prospectus. The boy’s mother com-
plained to the police, who told her that no action could be taken
without visible bruising. 
Although the Court ultimately held, by a vote of 5-4, that
there had been no violation of Article 3 (prohibiting torture and
inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment) and, unanimous-
ly, that there had been no violation of Article 8 (generally prohibit-
ing interference by a public authority with family and private life)
or of Article 13 (providing an effective remedy notwithstanding
that the violator acted in an official capacity), the decision in
Costello-Roberts is an important reiteration of the view that private
action can engage state responsibility. Significantly, the Court
wrote that it “agrees with the applicant that the State cannot
absolve itself from responsibility by delegating its obligations to
private bodies or individuals.”59 Therefore, the Court wrote:
[I]n the present case, which relates to the particular
domain of school discipline, the treatment complained of
although it was the act of a headmaster of an independ-
ent school, is none the less such as may engage the
responsibility of the United Kingdom under the
Convention if it proves to be incompatible with Article 3
or Article 8 or both[.]60
If this proposition is true in the context of private education
— where private companies may control many, but not all, aspects
of the students’ lives — it is even more compelling in the context
of private incarceration — where private companies may control
all aspects of their charges’ lives. 
In a discussion of the privatization of education, Professors
Fons Coomans and Antenor Hallo de Wolf assert that certain
functions in the area of education ought not to be contracted
out.61 In parallel fashion, certain functions within the prison set-
ting — such as food service, medical service, educational service,
and vocational training — can appropriately be privatized, assum-
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Prisoners playing chess in a state prison in Massachusetts.
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ing that the overall level of quality regarding these services is not
diminished. But other functions of the incarceration system —
those in which accountability to the public is essential and inex-
orable — i.e., justice-based government functions — go well
beyond what Professor Graham calls “essential services” and what
the European Union refers to as “services of general interest.”
They are and properly should be so uniquely governmental in
nature that contracting them out should be viewed as both bad
policy and unlawful.
CONCLUSION
THE PURPORTED BENEFITS OF PRISON privatization should not
be permitted to thwart, in the name of convenience, considera-
tion of the broader and more difficult problems of criminal jus-
tice. To be sure, something must be done about the sordid state of
prisons and jails throughout the world. The urgency of the need,
however, should not interfere with the caution that must accom-
pany a decision to delegate to private companies one of govern-
ment’s most basic responsibilities — controlling the lives and liv-
ing conditions of those whose freedom has been taken in the
name of the government and the people. 
To allow privatization to expand to international markets
with little or no scrutiny is clearly inappropriate. Responsible
officials in other countries should have the foresight to seek
intelligent alternatives to the crisis of over-incarceration. As
Professor Lamarche writes, “[A] complex world deserves com-
plex solutions.”62 Thus, governments should avoid the political
quick-fix that private prison and jail companies promise to pro-
vide. And they should not be led in any way to the conclusion
that privatization in this critical area of criminal justice makes
good sense simply because some government entities in the
United States have voted to contract out some prisons and jails.
It does not. If, as Professor Felipe Gómez Isa suggests, “global-
ization [might] someday provide opportunities for the universal
extension of human rights,”63 such an extension should ulti-
mately apply to incarceration policies in the United States as
well. In short, other countries should neither adopt nor expand
our lamentable experiment with private incarceration. HRB
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